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Stevenson: The Corporation as a Political Institution

THE CORPORATION AS A
POLITICAL INSTITUTION
Russell B. Stevenson, Jr.*
For most of this century the large business corporation has
occupied a position in the front ranks of those institutions whose
size and power-immanent or transitive-inevitably generate a
need for teir legitimation.' It is a paradox perhaps, but a commonplace one, that the freedom of a powerful organization to function within a democratic society ultimately depends upon the existence of real or imagined constraints on that freedom. For a
democracy will not long tolerate in its midst centers of power that
are not perceived as responsive to the needs of the people and at
least in some measure accountable to the popular will.
Because of the source of corporate power and the role corporations play in society, it is natural that those who first sought to
explain how society controls the corporation, or more accurately,
2
corporate management, did so in predominantly economic terms.
Classical economic theory assumed that corporations would be subject to control by the invisible hand of the marketplace. Shareholders, exercising their will through the mechanism of "shareholder
democracy," would require management to work for the maximization of profits. 3
Berle and Means dealt a near fatal blow to that theory with
their finding of a "separation of ownership from control" in the
large publicly held firm. 4 To accord with this finding, the original
theory was eventually amended to downplay the role of sharehold*
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1. For a brilliant exposition of the history of this phenomenon and its results,
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early theorists of corporate control. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). See
generally A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
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3. For a discussion of the earliest theories of corporate legitimacy, see J. HURST,
supra note 1, at 13-57.

4. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 2, at 70; see id. at 47-125.
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ers as electors and to emphasize instead their role as purchasers
and sellers of stock. According to this revised theory, managerial
discretion is limited by the free market, where shareholders make
discontheir views felt by selling their shares when they become
5
tented with the performance of incumbent management.
No amount of theoretical rationalization, however, has been able
to conceal from the public the fact that corporations are occasionally
guilty of abuses of their power. 6 In the world of today, corporations
and those who manage them are no longer able to bathe comfortably in the warm delusion that their actions are irresistibly dictated
-and their power thus legitimated-by the invisible hand of the
marketplace. In the last decade or so the lamp of reason has finally
awakened the business community and its observers to the reality
that the corporation, that preeminently economic institution, has
become-nay, has always been-a political institution as well. It
has become inescapably clear that while the forces of economics do
indeed play a crucial role in shaping corporate behavior, large corporations respond-sometimes with an alacrity that is startling in
such bureaucratic behemoths-to the vagarious currents of political
forces as well.
The "political" forces of which I speak are perhaps best defined in the negative: Those extrinsic influences on corporate behavior, arising out of popular feelings, that are not expressed directly through the market mechanism. These forces often have
economic aspects. A corporation may, for example, seek to build a
favorable public image, or to avoid an unfavorable one, because of
that image's potential impact on the corporation's sales, its ability
to recruit executive talent, or the morale of its employees. A corporation may choose or refrain from a particular course of action
out of fear of inviting governmental regulation. But the calculus
that leads a company to improve its pollution control program, 7 to
stop manufacturing napalm, 8 or to withdraw from South Africa 9 is
5. See Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1427, 1430-34 (1964). See also H. MANNE & H. WALLICH, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND SociAL RESPONSIBILITY 14-16 (1972).

6.

See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMiAN, TAMING THE GIANT COm'O-

RATION 17-32 (1976); C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 35-69 (1975);

Heilbroner,

Controllingthe Corporation,in IN THE NAME OF PROFIT 223, 223-24 (1972).
7. See D. VOGEL, LOBBYING THE CORPORATION 99-100 (1978).
8. See Friedman, This Napalm Business, in IN THE NAME OF PROFIT 128

(1972).
9. See D. VOGEL, supra note 7, at 168-89.
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not related to the laws of supply and demand in the conventional
manner in which most corporate economic decisions are made.
Perhaps because Plato and Aristotle, not to mention Locke
and Rousseau, were not called upon to address the issue, and perhaps because our recognition that an issue exists dates from relatively recent times, we seem a long way from an acceptable general theory of the influence of political forces on corporate
behavior. To attempt the development of such a theory today
would be ambitious, if not rash. Simple prudence suggests that
that effort await an empirical foundation constructed by observers
sensitized to look at the corporation in a new way. 10
At any rate, this Article makes no pretensions to any such undertaking. It has four far more modest goals: First, to review some
of the more important currents of contemporary theorizing about
the sources of legitimacy of corporate power; second, to sketch several of the principal mechanisms through which external political
forces are translated into changes in corporate behavior; third, to
examine some results of the increasingly common demand that corporations disclose more information about their activities to facilitate the workings of political forces; and fourth, to furnish a very
tentative response to the question whether all of this is a good idea
in the first place.
THEoRIEs

OF CORPORATE LEGITIMACY

The theme that corporations are-and should be-influenced
by political forces is a relatively new one. Originally played by a
lonely scholar or two somewhere in the woodwind section, it has
gradually been picked up by more and more members of the orchestra, until it now approaches a crescendo. Neil Jacoby, a professor of economics, has created a Social Environmental Model of
the business corporation whose most important characteristic is
"the explicit recognition that corporate behavior responds to political as well as to market forces."" David Vogel, a political scientist,
10. Such a literature seems to be emerging. See generally id.; Blumberg, The
Politicalizationof the Corporation,26 Bus. LAw. 1551 (1971). Vogel writes that with
one exception, "there has been no comprehensive scholarly treatment of direct political challenges to the corporation. Political scientists continue to reify the term 'political,' equating it with activity having to do with governments and thus, with
relatively few exceptions, overlooking political pressures on other institutions." D.
VOGEL, supra note 7, at 229.
11. N. JACOBY, CORPORATE POWER AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 195 (1973)
(emphasis deleted).
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finds in his recent study, Lobbying the Corporation,12 that in
most instances, "corporations take citizen demands .

.

. with

increasing seriousness. The demands are regarded as a permanent,
though not necessarily legitimate, part of the political and social
environment of the modem firm."1 3 Vogel concludes that "[b]y any
objective criteria . . . the acceptance of citizen pressures by busi-

ness has increased considerably.' 14 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) suggests that among the constraints on the corporate clients of their members are "the
pressures of the general public or general and self-interest groups."1 5
The Committee for Economic Development, one of the more important organs of the liberal business establishment, recognizes
that "[blusiness functions by public consent."' 6 This, in turn,
implies a degree of accountability: "The great growth of corporations in size, market power, and impact on society has naturally
brought with it a commensurate growth in responsibilities; in a
democratic society, power sooner or later begets equivalent accountability."17

This new willingness to acknowledge that corporations do, in
fact, respond to forces of a frankly political nature does not represent a discontinuity in thinking about the social control of the
corporation but is firmly rooted in a number of more recent theoretical antecedents. The most conventional of these is a direct
descendant of the standard legal model of corporate governance by
shareholder democracy. According to this model, the power
wielded *by management is legitimated by the control exercised by
shareholders through the medium of the corporate electoral
system-or at least that power could be so legitimated if only the
12.
13.

D. VOGEL, supra note 7.
Id. at 203.

14. Id. at 203-04. Vogel goes on to say, somewhat paradoxically: "Clearly what
is least important about citizen pressures has been their direct, substantive effect on
corporate decisions. These have been, and are likely to remain, marginal." He suggests that a more significant impact of the process he describes is to be found in the

"dynamics of government regulation of business." Id. at 226. Thus, "[t]he most fundamental contribution of citizen pressures has been to link the corporation more

closely with the vitality and turbulence of the democratic process." Id. at 227.
15. COMM. ON SOCIAL MEASUREMENT, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. AcCOUNTANTS, THE MEASUREMENT OF CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE 5 (1977).
16. COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF BusiNESS CORPORATIONS 11 (1971).

17.

Id. at 21 (emphasis deleted).
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electoral system were perfected.' 8 Although the exponents of this
view seldom said so explicitly, they seemed to rely heavily on the

steadying influence of shareholder suffrage to reduce the incidence
of corporate invasions of the public interest-after all, shareholders
are members of the public, too. It is ironic that just when the notion of shareholder control seemed finally to have expired from the

near-fatal blow administered by Berle and Means' 9 and their intellectual successors, 20 it was shareholder activists, who had apparently

read the old wisdom but not the new, who proved that the corpobe fashioned into an efrate electoral machinery could, after all,
21
accountability.
increased
for
fective tool
Other theorists have conceived of large corporations as private governments. Emphasizing the statelike nature of their power over a body of constitutents far broader than shareholders, they
urge recognition that members of this broader group are entitled to
22
a voice in corporate decisionmaldng.

A related body of literature finds the governmental character

23
of the large corporation in its close relationships with the state.

Proponents of this view point to public utilities that perform functions of a governmental or quasi-governmental nature;2 4 to con-

18. See, e.g., F. EMERSON & F. LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY (1954);
Bernstein & Fischer, The Regulation of the Solicitationof Proxies: Some Reflections
on Corporate Democracy, 7 U. CHI. L. REv. 226 (1940); Katz, The Philosophy of
Midcentury CorporationStatutes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 177, 188-92 (1958).
19. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 2, at 69-125.
20. E.g., Chayes, The Modern Corporationand the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25, 40 (E. Mason ed. 1959); Rostow, To Whom and
for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY 46, 53-56 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
21. See notes 35-49 infra and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., R. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? 115-40 (1970); R. EELLS,
Preface to THE GOVERNMENT OF CORPORATIONS at v (1962); Brewster, The Corpoation and Economic Federalism, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 72 (E.
Mason ed. 1959); Latham, The Body Politic of the Corporation,in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 218 (E. Mason ed. 1959); Miller, Private Governments
and the Constitution, in THE CORPORATION TAKE-OVER 122, 142-49 (A. Hacker ed.

1964).
23. E.g., J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 308-28, 406-08 (3d ed.
1978); A. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE 113-42 (1976); Miller, A Modest
Proposalfor Helping to Tame the Corporate Beast, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 79, 86-89
(1979).
24. There is substantial overlap between the types of functions performed by
private" corporations, such as utility companies, and "public" corporations or governmental agencies, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, Comsat, and Amtrak.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1979

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 39

tractors producing military equipment under governmental contracts or in governmental laboratories; and to consumer product
firms that are subject to governmental licensing, regulations, and
reporting requirements. 25 They argue that the obvious entanglement of private business with the state is bound to increase,
notwithstanding efforts at deregulation. Those who are of this persuasion tend to find the source of legitimation of corporate power
26
in a growing assimilation of the corporation into the state.
Managerialism is another body of thought in which can be
found an implicit recognition of the political character of the modem corporation.2 7 The managerialists tend to focus on the part
played by the corporate executive, whom they cast as a sort of philosopher king. This new executive's appropriate mode of behavior
is to engage in "leadership" and "interest balancing," 2 8 apparently
guided largely by his orher own conscience, perhaps as it reflects
the mores of society at lark. Recently, possibly because they find that
role a bit uncomfortable, some management representatives have
begun to find limits on their behavior growing out of the "onerous
compulsion and harassment" to which the corporation will be subjected "if it does not do its part in helping create" a "healthy, pros29
perous, and well-functioning society."
Finally, organizational behaviorists have been suggesting for
some time that the goal of managers of large corporations has never
been to maximize profits. Instead they "satisfice," juggling a complex mix of competing demands, many of them only remotely connected, if at all, with conventional economic considerations.a 0
Whatever its analytical structure, the question addressed by
each of these schools of thought is no less than the central problem
25. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act §§ 1-34, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081
(1976) (protecting public against unreasonable risks of injury from consumer products); Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act §§
110-112, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976) (improving adequacy of information available
to consumers).
26. E.g., J. GALBRAITH, supra note 23, at 413-14.
27. See, e.g., H. BOWEN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BUSINESSMAN 85
(1953); P. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 115-17 (1946); D. LILIENTHAL,
BIG BUSINESS: A NEW ERA passim (1953); Mason, The Apologetics of "Managerial-

ism," 31 J. Bus. 1, 1 (1958).
28.

COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 16, at 22.

29. Id. at 29.
30. See McKie, Changing Views, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THEIBUSINESS
PREDICAMENT 17, 31-32 (J. McKie ed. 1974). See generally R. CYERT & J. MARCH,

A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963); Cohen & Cyert, Strategy: Formulation,
Implementation, and Monitoring, 46 J. Bus. 349, 352 (1973).
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of all political theory: How can society assure that those who occupy positions of power will exercise it responsibly and efficiently
(which, in a democratic society, implies accountably)? In the case
of corporate power, the answer remains far from clear.
THE MECHANISMS OF POLITICIZATION

Traditional modes of political analysis do not translate well into
a corporate context for the self-evident reason that the electoral
mechanism, to which all democratic political analysis must ultimately refer, occupies a place in corporate politics that is, if not
negligible, very nearly so.
Although the shareholders do elect, at least nominally, the
board of directors, and although one still hears references to corporate democracy, it is unrealistic "to rely on the shareholder constituency to keep corporate power responsible by the exercise of
Shareholder democracy, so-called, is misconthe franchise . ...
ceived because the shareholders are not the governed of the corporation whose consent must be sought" 3 '- We must, therefore, look
elsewhere for the mechanisms by which political forces operate on
the corporation. I would suggest three such mechanisms as among
the most important: The impact of public opinion on the managerial psyche; the effects, real or imagined, actual or potential, of public opinion on the economic welfare of the corporation; and the fear
of regulation.
Public Opinion and the ManagerialPsyche
The corporation, that "mere legal entity,"3 2 has, as Blackstone put
it, no soul.3 3 It is not subject to social pressures, cannot be shamed

or embarrassed, and cannot be conditioned to behave in a given
way. That is not, however, true of its managers. Corporate executives live in the communities in which their firms operate. They
enjoy whatever measure of prestige-or obloquy--comes from
their corporate affiliation. And of course they must, in the end, live
with their own consciences.
As Francis Rourke has pointed out, primitive societies rely
heavily on publicity as a means of informal punishment for violations of social, or even legal, norms. 3 4 We are not far from the day
31.
32.
33.
34.

Chayes, supra note 20, at 40.
Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809).
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 465.
F. ROURKE, SECRECY AND PUBLICITY 113-17 (1961). See generally D.

RIESMAN, THE LONELY CROWD (1950).
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when miscreants were locked in the stocks or the pillory in the
town square to receive the scorn of their neighbors. As society
grew larger and more complex, we moved away from the use of
public disgrace as a punitive measure. But with the advent of modem mass communication we seem to be moving back in that direction.
Surely the new generation of shareholder activists must realize
this, at least implicitly. One need not be a director of a large public corporation to understand the discomfort with which those
benighted individuals face the annual ordeal of the shareholders
meeting. The shareholder responsibility movement has become
an enormously effective tool for bringing the pressure of public
opinion to bear on corporate managements. Since the launching in
1970 of Campaign GM, the first chapter in what has proved to
be a remarkably successful and durable saga, 35 hundreds of corporate responsibility resolutions have been put before the shareholders of scores of corporations in what has become for many an annual ritual.
When they have been opposed by management, as has typically been the case, only a small proportion of these resolutions has
won the three percent of the shareholder vote necessary to qualify
for subsequent resubmission. 36 But that apparently dismal showing
is by no means a measure of the movement's success. The 1970
General Motors resolutions, for example, asked for the addition of
three new board members: A black community leader, a female
consumer affairs expert, and an environmental scientist.37 The
shareholder activists also sought the creation of a Shareholders
Committee for Corporate Responsibility to conduct and submit to
the shareholders a study of GM's performance with respect to a
number of major social issues. 38 Neither resolution received three
percent of the vote. Yet, within three years, General Motors had
35. Campaign GM was launched in f970 by the Project on Corporate Responsibility, a "public interest group" organized for the principal purpose of forcing social
considerations into corporate decisionmaking. The Project was the first such organization to make conscious and sustained use of the SEC's shareholder proposal mechanism, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1979), as an effective tool for this purpose. Its example

has since been followed by numerous other organizations. General Motors was selected to be the first target of the Project's efforts largely because of its symbolic status as representative of large American corporations. See D. VOGEL, supra note 7, at
71-89; Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM,
69 MICH. L. REV. 419, 423-25 (1971).
36. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(12) (1979).
37. See D. VOGEL, supra note 7, at 78; Schwartz, supra note 35, at 426.

38. See D. VOGEL, supra note 7, at 78; Schwartz, supra note 35, at 424-25.
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elected to its board a black community leader, a woman, and an
eminent scientist; it had established a Public Policy Committee
composed of outside directors; and it had commenced a series of
conferences on Progress in Areas of Public 39Concern, extensive
reports of which were sent to the shareholders.
"Unsuccessful" shareholder proposals on a variety of issues
have achieved similar responses from numerous other large corporations. 40 The pressure of church groups on corporations with investments in South Africa, for example, has caused managements
not only to focus their attention on local conditions there but in
many cases to change their employment practices. 41 Until recently,
few, if any, major corporations published statistical data relevant to
their employment of women and minorities. Since 1974, however,
partly in response to shareholder resolutions, large numbers of
firms have included this information in their annual reports. 42 A
similar campaign has resulted in the publication of facts concerning
many major firms' policies and practices with respect to the Arab
boycott of Israel. 43 And, at least in part because of shareholder
pressures, corporate boardrooms are no longer exclusively populated by white males.4
The submission of shareholder resolutions and the nature of
corporate responses to them has gradually become more sophisticated. In the early years of the shareholder responsibility movement most corporations stubbornly opposed shareholder resolutions. Firms would initially resist including shareholder proposals
in their proxy materials. If forced by the SEC to do so, management would almost invariably recommend a "no" vote and cast all
available proxies against the resolutions. 45 Lately, however, there
39. See Blumberg, supra note 10, at 1561-63; Schwartz & Weiss, An Assessment

of the SEC ShareholderProposal Rule, 65 GEO. L.J. 635, 643-47 (1977).
40. See generally D. VOGEL, supra note 7, at 203-06; Schwartz & Weiss, supra
note 39, at 642-48; see also Purcell, Management and the "Ethical" Investors, HARv.
Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1979, at 24. According to Purcell: "A look at the past five years
leaves little doubt that the public interest shareholder proposal movement has affected corporate management, raised its consciousness about a number of ethical issues, and caused it to do some things it would not otherwise have done." Id. at 30.
41. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 39, at 643-44. Obviously management's conscience is not the only reason for changes in corporate practices of this sort; direct
and indirect economic effects on the corporation play a role as well. See text accompanying note 56 infra.
42. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 39, at 644-45. See generally Stevenson,
The SEC and the New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50, 53-57 (1976).
43. Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 39, at 645-46.
44. See D. VOGEL, supra note 7, at 206.
45. See Schwartz, supra note 35, at 426-30, 483-85, 523-24.
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has been a marked trend toward negotiating with activist groups
before the annual meeting, with the result that corporate policies
are often either changed or explained to the satisfaction of the
shareholder proponents and the resolutions withdrawn. 46
The impact of this new movement has not been exclusively
dependent on the efforts of a few small public interest organizations and church groups. While they have furnished both the infantry and the generalship of the movement, they often have lacked
firepower. Increasingly, however, they have made up for that deficiency by impressing into the service of their cause large numbers
of institutional investors, including charitable foundations, college
and university endowment funds, mutual funds, banks, pension
funds, and insurance companies. 47 These are the voices of the establishment. Corporate executives might be able to shrug off pressure from the Project on Corporate Responsibility, the National
Organization for Women, or even the Church Project on U.S. Investments in Southern Africa. But when their policies are met with
expressions of concern-or even hostile votes-by the Harvard
Corporation, the Ford Foundation, and a variety of banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds, management cannot but begin
to take notice. In the process, institutional investors have become
so concerned about their own responsibilities in this area that a
group of them organized the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC),48 whose function is to prepare background papers for
the use of IRRC's members voting on shareholder resolutions.4 9
The idea that large corporations should be concerned about the social consequences of their behavior is thus coming fully into the
mainstream of contemporary mores, a fact that not even the most
reactionary corporate executive can ignore completely.
Although the shareholder responsibility movement has certainly been the most dramatic mechanism for directing the currents
of public opinion against the broad surfaces of the management
psyche, it is far from the only one. The campaign of the late 1960's
46. See Hartley, More Concerns Willing to Enter Negotiations on Holder
Resolutions, Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
47. See D. VOGEL, supra note 7, at 94-107.
48. Id. at 100-02.
49. There has also been an enormous quantity of writing on the subject of the
responsibility of the institutional investor prompted by the shareholder movement.
See, e.g., B. LONGSTRETH & D. ROSENBLOOM, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1973); J. SIMON, C. POwERS &- J. GUNNEMANN,
THE ETHICAL INVESTOR (1972). See also D. VOGEL, supra note 7, at 94-107.
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to induce Dow Chemical Company to cease manufacturing napalm,
then being used in the war in Vietnam, is a prime example of some
of the other public relations techniques used to convince corporate
management to change its policies. 50 The participants in that effort
picketed, demonstrated, and sat-in 5 ' to bring Dow's involvement
in napalm production to the attention of the public and, surpris52
ingly enough, to the awareness of Dow's own top management.
In the course of the campaign, Dow's top executives came under
pressure from friends, employees, and even their own children.
Ultimately the company extricated itself by entering what it must
have known would be a losing bid for the renewal of the napalm
contract. 53
As the Dow case exemplifies, the very fact that management's
attention is drawn to a particular aspect of the corporation's activities may be a significant element in bringing about change. A famous cartoon in the New Yorker shows a well-tailored executive
standing at the end of a large pipe from which an unpleasant looking liquid is pouring into a waterway. Speaking to the bureaucrats
behind him, he is remarking, "So that's where it goes! I'd like to
thank you fellows for bringing this to my attention." 54 A lengthy
study of corporate reporting requirements prepared by a group
of British accountants makes the same point somewhat less graphically:
It is important to keep in mind the pervasive influence of
reporting practices on management attitudes. Managements naturally respond to those indicators by which they consider their
performance is judged, and strive to achieve and present results
accordingly. Special attention is bound to be given to those areas
55
wvhere the spotlight falls.
The message is clear. Anything that broadens the view of managers
beyond the traditional measure of success provided by the profit50. The campaign is described in Friedman, supra note 8, at 128-53.
51. They also were among the first to try the shareholder resolution tactic, but
were prevented from getting their proposal in the management proxy materials before Dow finally capitulated. See Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC. 432
F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), dismissed as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
52. Dow's president stated that he was unaware of the contracts to supply napalm to the Defense Department until the demonstrations began. Friedman, supra

note 8, at 136.
53. Id. at 151-53.
54. Stevenson, NEW YORKER, Nov. 7, 1970, at 47 (cartoon).
55.

AcCOUNTING STANDARDS STEERING CoMm., THE CORPORATE REPORT 38

(1975).
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and-loss statement is bound to influence the way management approaches corporate decisionmaking.
The Economic Effects of Public Opinion
It is not just management psyches that suffer from a negative
corporate image. Corporations are also affected in more conventional ways by hostile public opinion generated by adverse publicity. Corporate managers justify the large sums they spend on
public relations with the rationale that a favorable public image
promotes sales. 56 Particularly in oligopolistic markets where competing goods are very similar in quality, a firm's share of the market depends in large part on its brand image. This image in turn
depends on a complex blend of factors, only one of which is the
overall standing of the corporation in the public favor; but a manager who ignores public opinion does so at his or her peril.
Even firms that do not sell directly to the public are usually
concerned about their images. United States Steel, for example, is
anxious to let us know "We're involved." Dupont tells us about
"Better things for better living through chemistry," and Union Carbide claims "Something we make will touch your life." Some of
this concern can be traced to management's desire for association
with a prestigious company; however, there can be no doubt that a
prime motivation for improving the corporate image is the belief in
its relation to profitability.
The notion that corporate image is linked to corporate profits
is almost certainly valid for firms that sell directly to the public. It
may even have some validity for those that do not. In the end,
however, it matters little whether the notion is in fact correct.
What matters is that the executives of so many large corporations
believe it is. As long as corporate management perceives public
opinion as a factor affecting profitability, corporate decisionmaking
will be responsive to political considerations.
Fearof Regulation
Corporate executives have learned that if their manner of conducting business creates problems of sufficient concern to a sufficient number of people, the government will eventually react by
changing the rules. Gone are the days of "the public be damned."
As Adolf Berle wrote,
[A] modem American corporation understands well enough that
56.

D. VOGEL, supra note 7, at 43-54.
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it has a "constituency" to deal with. If its constituents-notably its
buyers-are unsatisfied, they will go to the political state for solution. Hardly any present-day board of directors or corporation
management would take the position that it could afford to disre57
gard public opinion-or would last very long if it did.
Berle was writing in 1954, before the civil rights movement, the
women's movement, the environmental movement, and a variety
of other causes had begun to wield the influence to which we have
become accustomed. Were he to consider the same problem today,
he would hardly be able to limit a corporation's constituency to its
buyers.
Business executives do not like regulation except when it
serves to reduce the pressures of competition. Their reasons are
complex. In part they object to the economic costs imposed by regulation. 5 8 But the negative reaction of corporate executives is, perhaps, more often a product of the limitations on their flexibility,
the challenge to their self-image as lords of their own dominion,
the insult to their ideological view of the world, and other "psychic" costs of regulation. 59 Whatever the reasons, and however
valid, it is clear that executives are averse to regulation. Their
aversion is an important factor in determining the corporate response to those political forces that carry a credible threat of regu60
lation.
POLITICS AND INFORMATION

In the corporate political system, as in all political arrangements, information plays a critical role. It is the mortar without
which the most elaborate political edifice would soon be a heap of
rubble. Seventy-five years ago, Theodore Roosevelt recognized the
importance of information in society's control of corporate behav57.

A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 56 (1954).
LANE, THE REGULATION OF BUSINESSMEN 16-18 (1966).

58. See R.

59. Id. at 19-35.
60. Ironically, it is the rare corporate manager, occupied as he or she is with
the normal affairs of management, who is able even occasionally to anticipate an adverse public reaction sufficiently in advance to correct a problem before it becomes a
matter of public concern. Although corporate efforts at self-improvement may be sincere, they are almost always inadequate to satisfy the popular will. Thus, the fear of
regulation is more likely to affect corporate style than the substance of corporate behavior. The result is that corporations, at least at first, apparently respond to political
pressures more by word than by deed. Even so, the fear of regulation remains a significant component of the political forces impinging on corporations, for institutions,
even more than individuals, often come in the end to be influenced by their own
rhetoric.
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ior. To ensure that large corporations function harmoniously with
our social institutions, he emphasized the crucial importance of
"knowledge, full and complete-knowledge which may be made
6
public to the world." '
There already exists a variety of legal rules that require corporations to divulge information about themselves. Most of these
rules, however, are founded on economic justifications: Shareholders are entitled to access to corporate books and records to protect
their interests as shareholders;6 2 the securities laws require the reporting of information for the protection of investors;6 3 various regula64
tions mandate disclosure to facilitate consumers' buying decisions;
65
and line-of-business data are sought to further antitrust goals.
While some of the information reaching the public by means of
these disclosure devices is undoubtedly relevant to the functioning
of political restraints on corporate conduct,6 6 no statute has been
explicitly designed for that purpose. From a political point of view,
the resulting patchwork of availability and nonavailability of information relevant to an assessment of corporate behavior is less than
wholly satisfactory.
Given the central role of information in the functioning of any
political process, it is inevitable that public demands for more information about corporations would increase in tandem with
mounting political pressures for substantive responses. Indeed, the
extent of corporate disclosure for "noneconomic" purposes could
well be taken as a measure of the extent to which the corporation
has become politicized.
61. T. ROOSEVELT, Message of the President of the United States, Communicated to the Two Houses of Congress, at the Beginning of the First Session of the
Fifty-Seventh Congress, in PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES AND STATE PAPERS OF
THEODORE ROOSEVELT 529, 543 (rev. ed. 1970). For a discussion of the historical development of this and other corporate governance issues, see Loomis & Rubman,
CorporateGovernance in Historical Perspective, 8 HoFSTRA L. REV. 141 (1979).
62. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 624
(McKinney & Supp. 1979-1980); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 52 (rev. ed.
1974). See H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 395-402 (1970).
63. E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13-14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-78n
(1976).
64. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.22-.35 (1979) (food labeling requirements); id. 99
201.300-.317 (labeling requirements for specific drug products); id. § 501 (labeling
for contraceptive products). See also Gardner, IncreasingPatientAwareness in Drug
Therapy: Ramifications of a PatientPackage Insert, 66 CEO. L.J. 837 (1978).
65. See BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION LINE OF BUSINESS REPORTING PROGRAM (1974).

66. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 42, at 51.
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The Demandfor Disclosure
In the last several years the reluctance of corporations to disclose information necessary to an evaluation of the social consequences of their conduct has often been more severely criticized
than have deficiencies in the conduct itself.67 Many shareholder resolutions take the form of requests for information. Responsible critics
of the corporation recognize that reducing pollution, producing
safer products, providing better working conditions for employees-in fact complying with nearly all of the substantive demands
being made on business in the name of corporate responsibility--can be accomplished only at a price that will ultimately be
passed on to consumers. There is, therefore, an increased willingness on the part of those who challenge corporate policy to listen
to, if not always to accept, reasons given by corporations for failing
to act, or for failing to act more quickly, to meet these demands.
Disclosure, on the other hand, involves only minimal direct costs
to corporations. 68 The public has become far less patient, therefore, with the failure of corporations to comply gracefully with reasonable requests for information about their activities. Demands for
increased disclosure have become "central to both the ideology and
' 69
the practice of the politics of corporate accountability."
The Council on Economic Priorities (CEP), one of the most effective of the public interest groups focusing on corporate issues,
has devoted much of its effort to detailed studies of the perform70
ance of various industries in areas of particular social concern.
CEP's executive director, Alice Tepper Marlin, remarked of one of
its first efforts:
Interestingly, when the press reported on our findings, its
heaviest criticism was not of the companies with the worst
records, though these were certainly heavily criticized. The most
adverse commentary was reserved for the companies that re[T]he public
fused to discuss their efforts with us honestly ....
to disinformation,
to
disclose
refusal
with
a
cannot sympathize
67. See, e.g., Blumberg, The Public's "Right to Know": Disclosure in the Major
American Corporation,28 Bus. LAw. 1025, 1037 n.3 8 (1973).
68. For a discussion of the direct and indirect costs of disclosure, see
Williamson, On the Governance of the Modern Corporation, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv.
63, 75-77 (1979).
69. D. VOGEL, supra note 7, at 129.
70. THE COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, PAPER PROFITS (1972).
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cuss problems fully and openly. The public objects to corporate
7
secrecy on social issues. '
Disclosure in Practice
Demands for public disclosure of corporate affairs have hardly
gone unnoticed by the managers of large corporations. Many have
begun to realize that information that previously would have been
kept secret can sometimes be disclosed to the corporation's benefit.
An example is recounted in a recent article by an executive of the
J.C. Penney Company. 72 In reaction to the general public impression that large retailers reap huge profits from their credit operations, a number of states enacted legislation reducing the allowable interest rates on charge account balances. This threatened to
be disastrous for Penney, a company already losing money on its
credit operation. The company reacted by publishing full details of
the financial status of its credit department, information that had
previously been treated as highly confidential. Many of Penney's
competitors followed suit, and these disclosures led to the prompt
73
relaxation of the new interest limits.
Whatever the motivation, corporations seem to be moving toward a policy of increased social disclosure. Probably the most
notable step has been taken by the BankAmerica Corporation. Under the leadership of chairman A.W. Clausen, long an advocate of
greater corporate disclosure, the corporation recently published a
71.

AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, SOCIAL MEASUREMENTS 74

(1972) (quoting Alice Tepper Marlin, executive director of CEP), quoted in
Blumberg, supra note 67, at 1037. Vogel describes the increasing demand for corporate disclosure:
Most public interest proxy resolutions challenge management's control

of information; their immediate objective is to increase the public's awareness of the nonfinancial dimensions of the performance of business. Virtually every citizen's group has put a significant portion of its energies into re-

searching and publicizing various aspects of corporate behavior. In addition
a number of citizen organizations have formed whose primary purpose is to
uncover and publicize as much information as possible about the social impact of corporate policies.

D. VOGEL, supra note 7, at 129. The AICPA concurs: "The day is long since past
when corporations can come before you and simply recount their successes and setbacks in strictly profit-and-loss categories. Now, they must also account for their activities in the social area-in matters of the environment, human resources,
consumerism, and product accountability." COMM. ON SOCIAL MEASUREMENT, supra
note 15, at 241.

72. Axelson, A Businessman's Views on Disclosure, J. ACCOUNTANCY, July
1975, at 42, 44.

73. Id.
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Voluntary Disclosure Code7 4 that begins with the proposition
that "[t]he public is entitled to the information necessary to judge
the value of BankAmerica's contributions to economic and social
well-being and its adherence to legal and ethical standards." 75
The significance of the shift in attitude toward disclosure
signalled by the BankAmerica code cannot be overstated. The typical posture of corporations approaching a disclosure issue is one of
extreme reticence. Corporate executives, like the members of any
bureaucracy, generally take the view "what they don't know can't
hurt me." 76 As a consequence, executives tend to resist the disclosure of any information unless it is required by law, or disclosure
promises some perceptible benefit to the corporation. The law,
treating the public corporation as a private institution, is supportive
of that attitude. 7 7 The underlying, unwritten premise, to which
disclosure requirements are exceptions, is that corporations,
like individuals and other private entities, are entitled to keep
secret that which they have the capacity to keep secret. The
BankAmerica code virtually stands this premise on its head. It announces that its purpose is to "reverse this priority, making the
'right to know' paramount and imposing limits only where it is
78
clearly appropriate."
While the reaction of BankAmerica's sister corporations suggests that the BankAmerica code has not quite launched the ship of
voluntary disclosure, it seems at least to have laid the keel. It may
74.

BANKAMERICA CORP., VOLUNTARY DIsCLOSURE CODE (1976).

75. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). The code lists five objectives:
1. To provide the men and women who manage BankAmerica with a
continuing guide that keeps effective disclosure a principal objective of corporate policy.
2. To facilitate disclosure of information that has been determined-not
by the corporation but by its constituencies-to be useful and relevant in
understanding and evaluating BankAmerica's activities.
3. To encourage disclosure of information in ways which can be easily
understood by all concerned.
4. To give the public ready access, to the extent permitted by law, to information the corporation currently provides in its routine reporting to
regulatory agencies.
5. To define the limits of voluntary disclosure-that is, to respond to the
public's question, "Why not?"
Id. at 4-5.
76. For the classic, and considerably more elegant, statement of this characteristic of bureaucracy, see 2 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 991 (G. Roth & C.
Wittich eds. 1978).
77. See Miller, supra note 23.
BANKAMERiCA CORP., supra note 74, at 7 (1976).

78.
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prove one day to have been the first major step toward what Professor Blumberg foresees as "the day where full disclosure of the
social and environmental, as well as financial, policies of major
business will be an accepted practice in keeping with the 'public'
character of the major American enterprise." 79
Another bit of evidence that corporations are moving in the direction of systematic evaluations of the noneconomic consequences
of their activities is the increasing number of corporations engaging
in some form of "social audit."80 The increasing use of social audit techniques indicates that a great deal of information necessary
to evaluate a corporation's social performance is already being generated, at least for internal corporate purposes. 81 However, the
79. Blumberg, supra note 67, at 1037.
80. The literature of the social audit is growing apace. Among the more important books are R. BAUER & D. FENN, THE CORPORATE SOCIAL AUDIT (1972); COMM.
ON SOCIAL MEASUREMENT, supra note 15; CORPORATE SOCIAL ACCOUNTING (M.
Dierkes & R. Bauer eds. 1973); J. CORSON & G. STEINER, MEASURING BUSINESS'S
SOCIAL PERFORMANCE (1974); E. GOLDSTON, THE QUANTIFICATION OF CONCERN
(1971); SOCIAL AUDIT SEMINAR, PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNCIL, SELECTED PROCEEDINGS

(1972); TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CORPORATE SOCIAL REPORTING IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE'
(1979). See also Abt, Managing to Save Money While Doing Good, INNOVATION, Jan.

1972, at 38.
81. There is little agreement on the function of social audits. Bauer and Fenn
suggest that their function is only partially to satisfy external demands for information. R. BAUER & D. FENN, supra note 80, at 47-76. They discuss internal uses of social audits as well, including salving executive consciences, anticipating and
avoiding community pressures, solving social problems, and increasing long-range
profits. Id.
A number of approaches have been used for "social measurement." One study
identifies five: (1) The "cost or outlay approach" concentrates on inputs, attempting
to identify and report total expenditures for social activities. (2) The "human asset
valuation approach" attempts to measure the effect of the corporation's social behavior on such intangible assets as the "value of shareholder loyalty, banker and finance
community goodwill, customer loyalty, supplier loyalty, and loyalty in tie communities where plants or offices are located." (3) The "program management approach" focuses on quantifying the costs and the benefits of those activities in which
the corporation is involved "largely for social reasons." (4) The "inventory approach"
is a nonquantitative effort to list and describe the areas in which society expects a
corporation to undertake certain behavior and what the corporation is actually doing
in those areas. (5) The "cost/benefit approach" encompasses a variety of means of
measuring and displaying the costs and benefits of actions taken or not taken by the
corporation for social ends. J. CORSON & G. STEINER, supra note 80, at 18-20. The

United States Task Force on Corporate Social Performance identifies two further approaches to social measurement: (1) In the "social-indicator approach," the corporation develops (or adopts) various measures of community well-being and then evaluates the effect of its activities on those indicators. (2) The "process audit" requires
the corporation, with respect to particular social problems on which the activities of
the firm may have an impact, to examine "the reasons for undertaking a particular ac-
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systematic evaluation of social performance by all large companies
for the purpose of regular reporting to the public remains a long
way off. According to a study done for the Committee for Economic Development, social audits have usually been undertaken
for corporation-centered reasons rather than out of a sense of obligation to render an account to the public, 82 and less than half of
the firms completing social audits made the results of their assess83
ments available to their stockholders or to the general public.
Corporate managers may find it helpful to develop, for their own
use, as accurate a picture as possible of the social impact of their
firms' activities, but the level of altruism required for the voluntary,
routine publication of the unedited versions of such comprehensive
social audits is to be encountered more often in the cloisters of religious institutions than in the executive offices of major corporations.
In truth it is hardly surprising that disclosures relating to social performance are used more for public relations than for the edification of the constituencies that might have an interest in the
unvarnished truth. The corporate response to compulsory disclosure requirements provides a dramatic contrast to the sort of voluntary social reporting that is becoming increasingly prevalent.
Evaluating the disclosures of environmentally related expenditures
required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 8 4 the AICPA
study remarks with some understatement,
[They] tend to portray the company's position in an objective or
even unfavorable fashion and frequently to present evidence of
considerable differences of opinion between the company and
the courts, regulators, and public interest groups ....
If disclosures in SEC reports are taken as models of what would be disclosed under pressure, one would be forced to conclude that voluntary disclosures of unfavorable matters in non-SEC reports
might leave much to be desired. One also would conclude that a
85
good deal of balance is lost in the process.
To an observer more cynical than the authors of the AICPA study,
tivity, the goals of the activity and the rationale for the action" and then to describe
what the finn is doing and attempt to measure its impact. TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE, supra note 80, at 5-9.
82. J. CORSON & G. STEINER, supra note 80, at 34.

83. Id. at 40-41.
84. Securities Act Release No. 33-5386, 38 Fed. Reg. 12,100 (1973). See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 239, 249 (1979).
85.

COMM. ON SOCIAL MEASUREMENT, supra note 15, at 232.
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this observation is hardly astonishing. The corporate manager who
voluntarily and routinely releases thorough, candid appraisals of
the firm's social performance, simply because he or she believes it
is right to do so, is still a very rare creature (a phenomenon for
which Darwin had an excellent explanation). Although there is an
increasing demand for firms to release more information about the
nonfinancial aspects of their activities, it is extremely doubtful that
the benefits to corporations of publishing regular, candid evaluations of company social performance will ever outweigh the obvious
economic and psychic costs. If the disclosure of social information
is ever to be an effective mechanism for improving the accountability of large corporations, society will have to undertake the difficult, perhaps impossible, task of designing and imposing reporting
standards.
POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In the final analysis a demonstration that corporations are political institutions is much less interesting than the more difficult
question of whether, and to what extent, corporations should be in86
fluenced by political forces. Would it be wise, as Professor Jacoby
and others 87 urge, to discard once and for all the fiction that corporate enterprise is governed exclusively by the invisible hand of the
marketplace, and to recognize explicitly that corporate behavior is
also subject to political forces? The incorporation of such a recognition among the tenets of accepted doctrine would slowly, but inevitably, lead to a major alteration in the way in which corporate
managers, the public, and scholars approach questions about the
role of large corporations in society. One principal result would be
an increase in the extent to which corporations do respond to political forces, and, probably, an accompanying decline in the efficacy
of economic forces in shaping corporate behavior.
The potential for mischief in such a trend is obvious. The advantage of harnessing corporate enterprise firmly to the profit
motive is that we know more or less where that will take us, and
we know more or less that the result will approximate something
we call economic efficiency. Should we partially unhitch the corporation from economic forces and direct it to respond to political
forces as well, we should be relying for the attainment of our social
86.

N. JACOBY, supra note 11, at 194-95.

87. See S. BUCHANAN, THE CORPORATION AND THE REPUBLIC (1958); Kaysen,
The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation,47 AM. ECON. REV. 311,313 (1957);
Note, For Whom Are CorporateManagers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
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goals on political mechanisms that are at best dimly understood;
and we should do so at the risk of jeopardizing whatever degree of
economic efficiency is attained by the functioning of the free market as we presently know it.""
The response of conservative economists to pleas for greater
corporate social responsibility is summed up by Milton Friedman's
now-famous dictum that "the social responsibility of business is to
increase its profits."8 9 He, and others of his persuasion, are fully
confident that the result of free and vigorous competition will be
the maximization of overall social welfare. 90 But as Christopher
Stone has pointed out, Friedman qualifies his injunction with an
innocuous little phrase that conceals far more than is at first apparent. 9 1 This increase in profits, he says, is to be accomplished
"while conforming to the basic rules of the society." 92 Friedman
subsequently suggests these rules include "both those embodied in
law and those embodied in ethical custom." 93 And there's the rub.
For the crux of the objections of the more thoughtful critics is that
corporations are far too often guilty of breaches of precisely those
legal and ethical norms by which Freidman suggests they should
94
be guided.
Perhaps it is enough to rely on the normal processes of law
enforcement to keep corporate conduct within those "basic rules of
society" that are embodied in the law. 95 But how, if not by political means, is society to force corporations to adhere to ethical
rules? One response is that there is no problem; the existing level
of corporate compliance with ethical norms, while far from perfect,
is at least adequate. 98 This must be taken as the response implicit
in the positions of Friedman and others who deny that there is any
88.

See Williamson, supra note 68.

89. Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32. See also M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962). For another articulate presentation of this point of
view and a rebuttal, see H. MANNE & H. WALLICH, supra note 5.
90. M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 89, at 133.
91. C. STONE, supra note 6, at 75-77.
92. Friedman, supra note 89, at 33.
93. Id.
94. See generally R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 33-131;
C. STONE, supra note 6, at 35-69; Heilbroner, supra note 6, at 225.
95. There may be room for "political activity" here, too. The Antitrust Division

of the Justice Department has made a point of seeking jail terms for corporate executives convicted of price fixing. Orland, Jail for CorporatePrice Fixers?, N.Y. Times,

Dec. 12, 1976, § 3, at 16, col. 3.
96. See, e.g., Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv.
93 (1979).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1979

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 39

need for more corporate responsibility. For others, however, that
response is inadequate. While we may be content with socialization, augmented by the constraints and sanctions of the law, to
maintain individual conduct above a minimally acceptable level,
the structural characteristics of corporations lead too often to behavior that would clearly be considered antisocial were it carried
on by individuals. As Christopher Stone says in his thoughtful
book, Where the Law Ends,97 "When individuals are placed in an
organizational structure, some of the ordinary internalized restraints seem to lose their hold."9 Thomas Schelling asks
whether the modem business corporation has to be thought of
as a solvent within which personal morality becomes unstuck.
Should human decency be considered incapable of surviving the
sterile atmosphere of the business firm? Can we not demand of a
large corporation-or, if not demand, wish for-the same decency that we think we have a right to expect from our paper
boy?
.. .May [corporate managers] not be encouraged, at least,
to forgo profits, consciously and openly, in the interest of behaving, as a firm, the way they would all wish to behave as individuals? 99
This is not to ask that firms spend the shareholders' money on
an elaborate program of good works. There is a distinction to be
drawn between corporate voluntarism and corporate responsibility. 10 0 Corporate responsibility-perhaps corporate accountability
is a better term-does not ask that tobacco companies stop making
cigarettes because smoking causes cancer. It does not suggest that
a corporation install expensive equipment to reduce its pollution
levels below those required by law. It does not require that corporations give money to charity. What corporate accountability does
demand is that corporations carry on their affairs with no less regard for the social and environmental consequences of their actions
than we would expect from an individual possessed of an ordinary
conscience. This means not engaging in ethically dubious conduct.
It means "willing compliance" with established public policy at
97.

C. STONE, supra note 6.

98. Id. at 35.
99.

Schelling, Command and Control, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE

BusINEss PREDICAMENT 79, 107 (J. McKie ed. 1974).
100. Schelling speaks of the "false dichotomy of voluntarism and coercion." Id.
at 103-05.
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"generous levels." 101 It means conforming to those demands that
society has found it desirable to embody in formal rules without
the obdurate resistance and niggardly interpretation that so often
characterize corporate responses to regulation.10 2 It also means
participation in policymaking and implementation as concerned
members of the community, rather than as adversaries. There is no
reason why corporations should not participate constructively in
the political process by seeking "mutual coercion mutually agreed
upon"' 03 -where it is necessary to resolve a social problem to which
the unregulated activities of separate corporations are contributing.
The point is that corporate responsibility is not the either/or proposition that Professor Friedman would have us believe. There is
a large gray area short of voluntarism in which corporations have
a great deal of latitude in determining how they go about increasing their profits.
CONCLUSION

We can no longer afford to deal with the problems of the social performance of large corporations by continuing to proliferate
the bureaucratic regulation that is already imposing unacceptable
burdens on our economic machinery. The most promising alternative is to modify the institutional framework within which corporations operate. One interesting move in that direction would be to
increase the extent to which political forces influence corporate
behavior.
The politicization of the corporation is not, to be sure, without drawbacks. If carried too far, it could weaken unacceptably the
grip of the "invisible hand of the marketplace" leading to a decline
in economic efficiency. There is also some risk that the infant political control mechanism that we have been discussing will not, even
in its maturity, provide an adequate replacement for that degree of
economic control of corporate behavior likely to be lost through an
explicit rejection of the notion that economic forces do provide a
satisfactory means of limiting managerial discretion. This would
leave corporate power subject to even less social control than it is
today.
101. Chirelstein, CorporateLaw Reform, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
BUSINESS PIEDIcAMENT 41, 53 (J. McKie ed. 1974).
102. See generally C. STONE, supra note 6, at 109; Chirelstein, supra note 101,
at 53; Heilbroner, supra note 6, at 239.
103. Schelling, supra note 99, at 103.
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A consideration of these aspects of the problem cannot, however, be abstracted from practical contemporary reality. Corporate
power is not generally perceived as fully legitimate. 10 4 It is inevitable, therefore, that there will be changes in the model that shape
our thinking about the mechanisms by which it is controlled and
thus legitimated. A move in the direction of changing that model
to recognize political forces as a legitimate and desirable means of
affecting corporate behavior must be considered in light of the
alternatives.
In the present state of affairs, the most likely alternative seems
to be offered by the managerialists, who would turn the corporate manager into a twentieth-century philosopher king. A great
many of those corporate managers most sensitive to the problem of
the legitimacy of their own power are adherents of this school of
thought, which furnishes a comfortable, nondisruptive-indeed
status-enhancing-justification for their social role. Since they are
and will remain in control of the large corporation, it is their view
that seems likely to dominate should the rest of society continue to
drift along without offering a more persuasive model.
Under these conditions the conclusion becomes almost inescapable that we have little choice but to undertake the development of an explicit political theory of corporate behavior that can
be set alongside the far more developed economic theory that no
longer provides an adequate basis for controlling the phenomenon
of the large business corporation. The articulation of a reasoned
theory of corporate accountability will enormously strengthen the
forces within the society that are already beginning to exercise
some influence over the social aspects of corporate behavior and
will no doubt bring others into existence. Until a theory far more
elaborate and better reasoned than any we now have is developed
and accepted, corporations will continue to treat political demands
that they act more "responsibly" as the illegitimate product of
fringe groups that simply do not understand or appreciate the
"American way."
104.

For evidence of this proposition, one need only review the steadily in-

creasing volume of literature critical of the role of the corporation in society. See
generally P. BLUMBERG, THE MEGACORPORATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1975); N.
JACOBY, supra note 11; M. MINTZ & J. COHEN, AMERICA, INC. (1971); R. NADER, M.

GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 6; C. STONE, supra note 6.
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